This study is an unusual contribution to the philosophy of mind in that it argues for the sometimes unfashionable view of dualism: that mind and matter are distinct and separate entities as Descartes believed. The author takes as his point of departure the imaginative hypothesis of disembodiment, which establishes the possibility of the mind's being a quite non-material thing. There are clear casual correlations between what is physical and what is mental, and the most serious issue confronting dualism since Descartes (...) has been how such an interaction is possible. Dr Hart sets out to answer this question by showing that the issue is as much about the nature of causation as it is about the natures of mind and matter. (shrink)

This book is concerned with the continuing viability of both Freud and Hegel to the reading of modern literature. The book begins with Julia Kristeva’s attempts to relate Hegelian thought to a psychoanalytically informed conception of semiotics that was first explored in her influential study, The Revolution of Poetic Language, and then modified in later books that develop semiotics in new directions. Kristeva’s agreements and disagreement with Hegel are important to the book’s argument, which ultimately defends Hegel against familiar, poststructuralist (...) detractions. However, the book’s conceptual argument requires a historical exposition, with chapters devoted to literary figures ranging from Spenser to Ishiguro. One of the purposes of the book is to demonstrate that Hegel’s contribution to modern thought is at least partially exhibited in the history of literature, which also corroborates some of the deeper insights of psychoanalysis. (shrink)

In Natural Ethical Facts William Casebeer argues that we can articulate a fully naturalized ethical theory using concepts from evolutionary biology and cognitive science, and that we can study moral cognition just as we study other forms of cognition. His goal is to show that we have "softly fixed" human natures, that these natures are evolved, and that our lives go well or badly depending on how we satisfy the functional demands of these natures. Natural Ethical Facts is a (...) comprehensive examination of what a plausible moral science would look like.Casebeer begins by discussing the nature of ethics and the possible relationship between science and ethics. He then addresses David Hume's naturalistic fallacy and G. E. Moore's open-question argument, drawing on the work of John Dewey and W. V. O. Quine. He then proposes a functional account of ethics, offering corresponding biological and moral descriptions. Discussing in detail the neural correlates of moral cognition, he argues that neural networks can be used to model ethical function. He then discusses the impact his views of moral epistemology and ontology will have on traditional ethical theory and moral education, concluding that there is room for other moral theories as long as they take into consideration the functional aspect of ethics; the pragmatic neo-Aristotelian virtue theory he proposes thus serves as a moral "big tent." Finally, he addresses objections to ethical naturalism that may arise, and calls for a reconciliation of the sciences and the humanities. "Living well," Casebeer writes, "depends upon reweaving our ethical theories into the warp and woof of our scientific heritage, attending to the myriad consequences such a project will have for the way we live our lives and the manner in which we structure our collective moral institutions.". (shrink)

There are a wide range of positions regarding the ontological nature of computer hardware and software. Moor [The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 29 (1978), 213–222] argues that there...

In the fall of 1869, the first of eight students set off from the tiny Sadowara Domain in southeastern Kyushu to pursue study in America and Europe. Overshadowed by more famous peers from other domains, the Sadowara students have been all but forgotten, and their lives abroad remain an untold story. Yet they played an important role in the early development of Japanese studies in the United States. Enrolling at diverse institutions mostly in the Northeast, six of the students came (...) to form a close relationship with Yale’s university librarian, a philologist named Addison Van Name. Inspired by his new friends to study the Japanese language, within a year Van Name was offering America’s first college course in Japanese, and he quickly began to produce scholarship on Japan and its language, literature, and history. By the mid-1870s, the Sadowara students had returned to their home country, where their subsequent careers constituted a microcosm of the paradox and transformation of the early Meiji period. Van Name maintained contact with his Japanese friends, and through this long-distance relationship succeeded in building America’s first significant Japanese library collection: a 3,000-volume collection of Edo and early Meiji titles that still survives today. (shrink)

Physiological studies show that the driving force for long distance transport and the control of nutrient movement in plants resides largely in the regulated, membrane transport of a few carbohydrates, principally sucrose. The evidence is reviewed here and biochemical studies on sucrose carrier proteins are discussed.

The dissertation is a detailed philosophical interpretation of the entire text of Plato's Sophist. In addition to extended analysis of the argument and discussion of many current interpretations, special attention is given to the following themes as they occur in other Platonic dialogues as well as the Sophist: ; Plato's theory of Knowledge: What is it that can be known? And how does one get to know it? Do the Sophist and other late dialogues show a change in Plato's views, (...) or an elaboration of views he held when he wrote such works as the Phaedo and the Republic? ;: these fall into three types: those with propositional structures, those which are structured like descriptions, i.e. denoting complexes, and definitions, which are denoting complexes of a special sort. Each of these types is discussed, and the role of definitions in Plato's theory of knowledge is explained. ; Judgments: what is a judgment, or opinion? How does a judgment come to be made? Plato distinguished questions about the internal structure of judgments or opinions from questions about what is involved in a person's coming to judge, or believe, or opine something. Both sorts of questions are discussed in the dissertation. ; Truth and falsity: two notions of truth, together with corresponding notions of falsity, are distinguished. One is a notion of truth as predicated of propositionally structured simpliciter. This is the notion which plays a dominate role in the Sophist. The other notion, which rears its head in the Cratylus and a short section of the Phaedrus, if a notion of true of as predicted of names and and what they are said of. Both notions, and other notions of truth held by Plato's philosophical opponents, are explained and discussed. ; Negation: What is the problem about being and not being^which arises in the Sophist? How is it related to the problem raised^as to how false judgments and are possible? Plato believed^that Parmenides made a mistaken assumption about negation, and^that that assumption could be used by sophists such as Protagoras^and Gorgias to undermine the thesis that mistaken judgments and^false occur. The central pages of the Sophist are devoted to^uncovering Parmenides' error, and to offering a replacement for the^assumption which Plato rejects. Plato then shows how the replacement he suggests can beused in an analysis of true and false and judgments. ;Numerous other themes arise in the course of the analysis of the argument--Plato's notions of time and change, of images, of explanation, etc. These, too, are discussed. There are twenty one appendices containing discussions of points of translation, alternative interpretations of key passages, formal proofs not appropriate for inclusion in the main body of the text and too extended for footnotes, and remarks on various passages occurring in other Platonic dialogues helpful in glossing the Sophist. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:“Analyzing How Rhetoric is Epistemic”:A Reply to Steve FullerWilliam D. HarpineMy point in "What Do You Mean, Rhetoric Is Epistemic" (Harpine 2004) is that unclear and inconsistent use of terms has hindered previous research on the idea that rhetoric is epistemic. I propose to clarify definitions to alleviate this problem and encourage further research into how rhetoric might be epistemic. Professor Fuller's viewpoint is that definitions are inherently problematic, (...) and that my call for rhetoric-is-epistemic theorists to formulate their definitions more carefully would hold rhetorical theory to "illusory" standards (Fuller 2005, 72). However, I feel that his criticism of definitions overstates what his arguments demonstrate. Fuller (2005) also expresses doubts about the concept of certainty, doubts which echo points in my essay. Along the way, he offers an interesting line of reasoning that might advance the dialogue in the way that I had hoped. To an extent, Fuller seems to reach similar conclusions about the relationship between rhetoric and knowledge, albeit by a different route.CertaintyMy essay argues that certain claims of rhetoric-is-epistemic theorists trade on an equivocation about the meaning of "certainty." The word "certain" can carry an objective meaning: "It is certain that I will have to pay taxes," or it can be subjective: "I feel certain that I will have to pay taxes." An ordinary person can easily see that the two claims mean something different. Although Wittgenstein explains this distinction most clearly, in a statement that Fuller (2005) himself quotes, the distinction routinely arises in everyday discourse. An argument that works surreptitiously by sliding from one of these meanings to the other commits the fallacy of equivocation. The rhetoric-is-epistemic literature does exactly that all too often. [End Page 82]On this matter, expressing doubts about objective certainty, Fuller comments that the role of certainty in philosophy is inconclusive (2005, 78). I fully agree with this point. My argument is to show how rhetoric-is-epistemic theorists fallaciously rely on an ambiguity in meaning, not to claim that some things really are objectively certain. It is not the purpose of rhetoric-is-epistemic theorists to argue that nothing is certain—there are much more straightforward ways to do that—but to show that rhetoric has an epistemic role. To accomplish this, they need an argument that does not short-circuit by equivocating in the use of key terms. In any case, my essay notes that "the current philosophical literature has not taken a strong stance in favor of requiring knowledge to be either objectively or subjectively certain," which resembles Fuller's own conclusion, and also that rhetoric-is-epistemic theorists "should dispense with the issue of certainty" (Harpine 2004, 346), which, if Fuller agrees (as I suspect he does), renders further details moot.KnowledgeMost rhetoric-is-epistemic theorists work either explicitly or implicitly with the traditional definition that knowledge is justified true belief. They point out that rhetoric offers justification. Gettier's argument shows that the traditional definition fails to capture the meaning of "knowledge." Thus, the rhetoric-is-epistemic theorists have a problem tying their theory to their conception of knowledge. The point is not that different rhetoric-is-epistemic theorists have used different definitions of knowledge, but rather that they work with an inadequate definition. Fuller agrees with Gettier's point, gives additional arguments on its behalf, and offers an interesting discussion of the rhetorical implications of Gettier's argument. Since Gettier's argument may lead one to question whether justification is a defining quality of knowledge, rhetoric-is-epistemic theorists might look for other kinds of linkages between rhetoric and knowledge. The concluding portions of my essay suggest several such possible linkages.1Does my argument resemble the Babel thesis? Elsewhere, Fuller (2002, 104) explains the Babel thesis as the claim that disagreements are due to different meanings, not to different beliefs. One must agree with Fuller that the Babel thesis overstates the importance of meaning. However, a similar insight arises in more modest guise as Davidson's principle [End Page 83] of charity. Studying intercultural relationships, Davidson (1984, 136) suggests that when we encounter people whose beliefs differ from ours, we... (shrink)

Early in Being and Time Heidegger announces that the primary concept by means of which he aims to understand Dasein is the concept to which he gives the name ‘existence.’ But what is existence? Existence is, roughly, that feature of Dasein that its self-understanding is constitutive of its being what or who it is. In an important sense, this concept embodies Heidegger’s existentialism. At the center of existentialism lies the claim that humans are given their content neither by an ahistorical, (...) transcultural essence, nor by nature. Rather, Dasein itself determines this content in its act of self-understanding. Kierkegaard expressed this in his famous formulation that “The self is that which relates itself to itself;” Ortega in his catchy phrase, “Man has no nature;” and Sartre in his notorious proposition, “Existence comes before essence.” All of these dicta articulate the same idea. (shrink)

The developing neuromuscular junction has provided an important paradigm for studying synapse formation. An outstanding feature of neuromuscular differentiation is the aggregation of acetylcholine receptors (AChRs) at high density in the postsynaptic membrane. While AChR aggregation is generally believed to be induced by the nerve, the mechanisms underlying aggregation remain to be clarified. A 43‐kD protein (43k) normally associated with the cytoplasmic aspect of AChR clusters has long been suspected of immobilizing AChRs by linking them to the cytoskeleton. In recent (...) studies, the AChR clustering activity of 43k has, at last, been demonstrated by expressing recombinant AChR and 43k in non‐muscle cells. Mutagenesis of 43k has revealed distinct domains within the primary structure which may be responsible for plasma membrane targeting and AChR binding. Other lines of study have provided clues as to how nerve‐derived (extracellular) AChR‐cluster inducing factors such as agrin might activate 43k‐driven postsynaptic membrane specialization. (shrink)

The present paper defends the thesis that Spenser's recovery of place, as enacted in 'The Faerie Queene,' Book VI, can be linked in a direct way to his use of a poetic phenomenology which informs and clarifies his work as an epic writer. Spenser's "Book of Courtesy" enacts a Neo-Platonic movement from the lower levels of temporal existence to an exalted vision of spiritual perfection. The paper explores this movement along phenomenological lines as a mysterious adventure that embraces self and (...) other, personality and community, aesthetics and ethics, in a sequence of images that opens up a new interpretation of imaginative fulfillment. -/- . (shrink)

This essay treats Private Management and Public Policy not only as one of the key building blocks of theory in the business and society field, but as a work of theoretical social science in the structural-functional tradition. As a work in the "s-f" tradition, it shares the weaknesses inherent in that mode of theorizing and introduces some of its own in the attempt to translate structural-functionalism into terms relevant for management. These problems are discussed in the context of detailed analysis (...) of the work's theoretical structure. (shrink)

It is argued that Heidegger should be seen as something of a Kantian Idealist. Like Kant, Heidegger distinguishes two standpoints (transcendental and empirical) which we can occupy when we ask the question whether natural things depend on us. He agrees with Kant that from the empirical or human standpoint we are justified in saying that natural things do not depend on us. But in contrast with Kant, Heidegger argues that from the transcendental standpoint we can say neither that natural things (...) do depend on us, nor that they do not. His reasons for saying this, however, represent an attempt to rework both Kant's temporal idealism and his temporal interpretation of the concept of an object (which shows up in Heidegger as a temporal interpretation of being). Heidegger suggests that Kant was led astray into a transcendental idealism about natural entities, because he did not understand the implications of transcendental idealism about being. (shrink)

The logical connection argument holds that factors which appear causally connected can be shown not to be so, At least when described in certain ways, If these factors are logically connected when so described. I argue that normal formulations of the logical connection argument confuse propositions and events. Moreover, When it is clarified in terms of "de re" necessity, It requires strong ontological assumptions for which no support is given and about the intelligibility of which there is reasonable question. I (...) conclude that the logical connection argument fails to give any reason for excluding any causal hypothesis. (shrink)

The Appeal to Tradition, often considered to be unsound, frequently reflects sophisticated adaptations to the environment. Once developed, these adaptations are often transmitted culturally rather than as reasoned argument, so that people mayor may not be aware of why their traditions are wise. Tradition is more likely to be valid in a stable environment in which a wide range of variations have been available for past testing; however, traditions tend to become obsolete in a rapidly changing environment.

Readers will gain insight in speaking truth in love, learn to avoid manipulating others, and realize the freedom of saying 'no.'"--Provided by publisher.

Contemporary U.S. policy makers often characterize the U.S. counterinsurgency experience in El Salvador as a successful model to be followed in other contexts. This article argues that these characterizations significantly overstate the positive lessons of El Salvador, and ignore important cautionary implications. During the first part of the conflict, neither the Armed Forces of El Salvador nor the U.S. followed the tenets of counterinsurgency doctrine. The FAES killed tens of thousands of non-combatants in 1979 and 1980, before the civil war (...) even began. This repression may have preempted an incipient popular insurrection, but it also locked in a determined social base that enabled the armed left to build a highly effective and sustained insurgency. In 1984, the U.S. had to save the FAES from likely defeat through a major increase in military aid, especially airpower. When the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front switched to a classical guerrilla strategy, the FAES, despite considerable U.S. aid, seldom followed best practices in counterinsurgency. Democratization and redistributional reforms were partial and flawed in implementation. The war settled into a stalemate that would likely have continued indefinitely had it not been for the collapse of the socialist bloc and significant changes in the interests of Salvadoran elites that were largely incidental to U.S. policies.The most important cautionary lesson is that indiscriminate violence against civilians early in a conflict can create dynamics that are very difficult to overcome in subsequent stages. (shrink)

Michael Zbaraschuk’s recent article, “Not Radical Enough: William Dean’s Problems with God and History,”1 deserves a published response, because it applies not only to my work but to that of many other philosophical theologians, some of whom read this journal. Before discussing the larger issues, I must attend to an item of scholarly housekeeping. Although Zbaraschuk draws narrowly, i.e., from only two of my books—History Making History (1988) and The Religious Critic in American Culture (1994)—he applies his arguments indiscriminately (...) to my work as a totality, omitting most crucially the score of articles and the book written between 1994 and the present. Of course, there is nothing wrong with an .. (shrink)

This book provides a distinctive account of Edward Said's critique of modern culture by highlighting the religion-secularism distinction on which it is predicated. This distinction is both literal and figurative. It refers, on the one hand, to religious traditions and to secular traditions and, on the other hand, to tropes that extend the meaning and reference of religion and secularism in indeterminate ways. The author takes these tropes as the best way of organizing Said's heterogeneous corpus - from Joseph Conrad (...) and the Fiction of Autobiography, his first book, to Orientalism, his most influential book, to his recent writings on the Palestinian question. The religion-secularism distinction, as an act of imagination and narrative continuity, lies behind Said's cultural criticism, his notion of intellectual responsibility, and his public controversy with Michael Walzer about the meaning and the uses of the Exodus story and about the question of Palestine. (shrink)